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ABSTRACT Video Surveillance (VS) systems are commonly deployed for real-time abnormal event detec-
tion and autonomous video analytics. Video captured by surveillance cameras in real-time often contains
identifiable personal information, which must be privacy protected, sometimes along with the locations of
the surveillance and other sensitive information. Within the Surveillance System, these videos are processed
and stored on a variety of devices. The processing and storage heterogeneity of those devices, together
with their network requirements, make real-time surveillance systems complex and challenging. This paper
proposes a surveillance system, named as Multi-Level Video Security (MuLViS) for privacy-protected
cameras. Firstly, a Smart Surveillance Security Ontology (SSSO) is integrated within the MuLViS, with
the aim of autonomously selecting the privacy level matching the operating device’s hardware specifications
and network capabilities. Overall, along with its device-specific security, the system leads to relatively fast
indexing and retrieval of surveillance video. Secondly, information within the videos are protected at the
times of capturing, streaming, and storage by means of differing encryption levels. An extensive evaluation
of the system, through visual inspection and statistical analysis of experimental video results, such as by the
Encryption Space Ratio (ESR), has demonstrated the aptness of the security level assignments. The system is
suitable for surveillance footage protection, which can be made General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
compliant, ensuring that lawful data access respects individuals’ privacy rights.
INDEX TERMS GDPR, ontology, partial encryption, privacy protection, video surveillance, surveillance
cameras, encryption, visual surveillance data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Video surveillance (VS) systems using fixed cameras have
many applications, which range from the monitoring of
threatened locations by the security and defense forces to
checking up on children at play, monitoring tourist attrac-
tions, and keeping an eye on critical infrastructures, to name
a few. They are now being networked, individually or collec-
tively, by means of the Internet of Things (IoT) [1]. In partic-
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
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ular, the IoT has been applied to emerging Smart Cities [2].
However, IoT devices are susceptible to attack [3] because of
their constrained resources. Yet they provide potential access
points to the traditional Internet, where hitherto some mea-
sure of security has been carefully built up. Thus, [4] provided
a layered framework for IoT security within a Smart City.
The IoT devices were lightweight microcontrollers. How-
ever, the security management software structure appears to
be conventional, based upon software managers and, as a
result, may be insufficient. Besides, traditional VS systems
represent a threat to the privacy of personnel working within
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environments under surveillance, such as a city airport,
as well as a threat to the privacy of members of the public
passing through that environment, who do not otherwise pose
any threat. In that regard, the system builds upon prior work
by the authors [5] on achieving compliance with the Euro-
pean Union’s (EU’s) recent legislation for privacy protection,
namely General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [6].
Thus, the motivation of this paper is to protect the video
content captured by a surveillance system. A surveillance sys-
tem [7] consists of different devices with different processing
and storage capacities. The surveillance devices may have
some embedded intelligence but may also be constrained in
terms of processing and storage capability [8]. The smart
security cameras, including those based around the popular
Raspberry Pi embedded processor, are capable of sending text
and with theMultimediaMessaging Service (MMS) can send
message notifications, images, and video clips [9].
In response to data and privacy protection of video con-
tents, which is the focus of the current paper, surveillance
video can be fully encrypted or selectively encrypted [10]
during communication, display, and storage. Though, cryp-
tographic protection of video is possible, the large amounts
of video data created and, possibly, stored, along with the
heterogeneity of surveillance devices, pose a problem as to
what forms of encryption are technologically appropriate.
Moreover, conventional security measures cannot necessarily
be applied to all of the surveillance data and, consequently,
this presents a challenge within the resource constraints
and dynamics of surveillance environment. In addition,
the heterogeneous nature of devices in operation in advanced
surveillance systems requires scalable and adaptablemanage-
ment frameworks, alongside streamed video confidentiality,
and secure storage of such ‘Big Data’.
This paper newly reformulates the design choices that
contribute to a system-level design. Several device-related
characteristics/parameters could be considered for the secu-
rity adaptation. Overall, storage remains a relatively high
expense and, therefore, making the right choice continues to
be crucial. For that reason, in this study, the following device-
related characteristics/parameters are considered to formulate
the different security levels to achieve data confidentiality of
surveillance videos:
1) Storage Capacity/Memory: the memory/storage capa-
bility of the surveillance applications is considered to deter-
mine which security level may be adopted to achieve
data confidentiality without generating significant encryption
overhead and energy consumption.
2) Energy/Power: Surveillance devices within surveillance
system may provide finite energy, as they are frequently
battery powered, particularly in the case of smart devices.
Encryption on these devices should be implemented in a way
that it cannot consume too much energy. Thus, this parameter
is selected to direct which security measure required to be
taken in the surveillance video.
3) Resolutions: Display resolution is another important
consideration that plays a vital role in surveillance videos.
Higher resolution provides a better-quality bitstream, which
escalates the possibility of identifying people and objects
within surveillance videos. However, the higher the resolution
puts a greater demand on network bandwidth, storage space
and power consumption.
4) Bandwidth: The videos streams and images captured by
smart cameras and camera-enabled sensors require different
bandwidths, depending on network technology and capacity.
Greater bandwidth can transmit higher resolution, smoother
videos at higher quality, even for high-motion scenes.
5) Throughput: In a surveillance system, data packets
can be transmitted over various communication technolo-
gies. Throughput is one of the most important concerns for
efficient power management when dealing with the real-
time interconnection between heterogeneous and ubiquitous
devices. Recently, the authors of [11] implemented fuzzy
logic to determine the sleeping time of the devices according
to the battery level and to the ratio of throughput to workload
in the smart home. Thus, in this study, throughput is consid-
ered an important input parameter.
6) Frame Rate: - Each video stream has a different frame
rate, depending on storage and bandwidth. Higher frame rate
provides smoother video in high-motion scenes. However,
the higher frame rate increases the demands of storage and
bandwidth requirements, which are unreasonable for con-
strained resources environment. Therefore, that should be
taken into consideration.
The proposed system is comprised of three main com-
ponents; (1) Features of Interest (FOI) (i.e. motion, face,
human and background) detection, (2) security level selec-
tion according to device specifications and (3) encryption
on the videos stream according to the security level output
from the second component. Notice that GDPR allows data
controllers/processors to retain an individual’s personal data
if they are in the form of pseudonymised information and/or
encryption (see Article 6(4) (e) and Article 32(1) (a)). That
is GDPR encourages data protection-by-design (see Article
25) [5], according to the sensitivity level of the data. For
video, video redaction through encryption is the normal data
safeguard provided by GDPR and indeed that safeguard is
adopted in the proposed security system if the data warrants
that protection. Accordingly, the current research innovates
with MuLViS, which is a data protection-by-design solution
in the GDPR sense. This solution, by using an SSSO, can
protect the sensitive video content by extracting contextual
information from real-time, surveillance videos. A prelimi-
nary, conference version describing the SSSO appeared as
[12]. The solution also recognizes critical storage-device
capabilities, such as storage capacity, energy consumption,
bandwidth utilization, and privacy protection is then achieved
by means of suitable FOI encryption. In short, a solution is
provided through MuLViS that is GDPR compliant.
The paper makes both system-level and technical inno-
vations. In summary of the effective original system-level
contributions of this paper, the security framework in the
paper works as follows:
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(i) FOI extraction performed on real-time surveillance
video by using different State-of-the-Art (SoA) computer
vision techniques. FOI’s are extracted on the bases of privacy
based use-cases given in Section II.A.
(ii) Multi-Level Video Security (MuLViS) designed and
implemented, utilizing the ontology. Five different secu-
rity levels are defined in the MuLViS. One of these lev-
els can be adopted according to security needs and device
capabilities.
(iii) Provision of automatic security level selection con-
cerning device resources by means of ontological reasoner.
The rules of the reasoner are defined using Semantic Query-
Enhanced Web Rule Language (SQWRL).
(iv) Lightweight, partial-encryption implemented on a
FOI, according to the selected security level recommended
by the ontological reasoner. Notice that though a lightweight
cipher, i.e. computationally less intense cipher, is not used,
the effect of partial encryption is to reduce the total amount
of data encrypted.
In addition, the paper’s main effective technical contribu-
tions and novelty are as follows:
(i) It presents a GDPR-compliant data protection-by-
design solution for surveillance videos by combining some
state-of-the-art computer vision algorithms with suitable
cipher. It does this, along with using ontology to select
devices in a video surveillance.
(ii) Multi-level security is achieved by partially encrypting
the specified FOI as per GDPR requirements, i.e. (1) motion
or texture within a video footage to conceal activities, (2)
human facial features or the full bodies of people to protect
the identities of individuals, and (3) background features to
conceal locations, all according to each different security
level. (Detailed use-cases of feature selection are given in
Section II.A in support of the GDPR requirements).
(iii) The proposed solution encrypts the video in such away
that the video will be partially viewable but will not allow any
individual to directly access the original video contents. Even
a ‘hacker’ will only be able to access the encrypted form of
video footage, thus meeting GDPR requirements.
To demonstrate the quality of these contributions, the paper
contains:
(a) Visual and statistical experimental results are discussed
in terms of their performance, as a way of evaluatingMuLViS
with its integrated SSSO, and
(b) A comparative analysis demonstrates the signifi-
cance of the security framework for smart surveillance
devices.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows: In Section II,
the context to this research is outlined. For those unfa-
miliar with that background, this Section is recommended.
Then, MuLViS and its modules are described in Section III.
Section IV presents extensive experimental results, along
with the performance of the system and its contribu-
tions. Finally, Section V makes some concluding remarks
and as well as considering possible future research and
development.
II. CONTEXT
It is vital to consider the various threats to video surveillance
security. Here is an illustrative list of the concerns that arise:
• Attackers may simply intercept surveillance video at
intermediate networked devices for the purpose of iden-
tifying the individuals under surveillance and the pur-
pose of surveillance.
• Attackers may use surveillance video interception as a
tool to better threaten monitored individuals, owing to
awareness of the protection measures in place.
• Attackers may modify the transmitted data and recipi-
ents may receive critically wrong information.
• Attackers may also record video previously and put this
recorded video back into a network so that surveillance
operators may regard this video as being sent in real-
time.
More generally, surveillance video contains sensitive and
personal information and these videos often need to be
streamed to screens. The video may subsequently be stored
on dedicated storage repositories, such as Digital Video
Recorders (DVRs), Network Video Recorders (NVRs), or a
cloud. Alternatively, the video may be stored on the end
devices themselves (such as on smart cameras) for a period
of time, so that if a significant event occurs the video can
be further processed for a detailed analysis. Because these
videos contain information about the subjects (places and
people) and activities around those subjects, during trans-
mission these videos are vulnerable to interception by mali-
cious individuals or groups. Likewise, videos stored on discs,
cloud, and end devices are vulnerable to inspection by hack-
ers, who can exploit a system’s security weaknesses. All these
events may result in data disclosure to unauthorized parties.
Indeed, in a surveillance system, the confidentiality of the
data is very important. For example, the location of places
under surveillance should remain confidential. Every multi-
media message or video stream, captured from surveillance
cameras, is sent to storage servers. In doing so, the video
passes through several nodes/access points to reach these
repositories using heterogeneous communication technolo-
gies. However, these access points and intermediate networks
can be extremely vulnerable to attacks. In fact, streamed data
can be exploited by the terrorist and by malicious users.
Therefore, it is necessary to adopt secure methods to protect
both live and stored surveillance data.
There are many examples of privacy and information leak-
ages to be found on news channels and on the world-wide-
web in general. Hence, the security of the surveillance data
and particularly the privacy protection of individuals shown
in the videos is a challenging requirement, given that pri-
vacy has risen higher on the public agenda [13]. In addition,
laws now exist that require that the privacy of individuals
should be preserved during surveillance. To this end, the EU
has recently adopted GDPR [6], which regulates the privacy
protection required for processing and storing personal data
within the EU. GDPR applies globally to data protection,
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if that data is used with the EU and even if it originates from
outside the EU but is used within the EU. It also harmonizes
relevant laws within the EU and ensures the rights and pro-
tections to both European citizens and visitors to the EU,
by providing data safeguards through a reversible process of
encryption.
Besides, real-time applications differ from existing con-
ventional surveillance approaches, due to the need for
low-latency communication and processing, despite resource
limitations and the huge volumes of surveillance multimedia
data [14]. In fact, currently, pervasive video-surveillance sys-
tems are a significant source of video traffic over the public
Internet. According to CISCO statistics [15], video traffic
is expected to grow to 82 percent of all internet traffic by
2022 and, of that, 3 percent of all internet video traffic will
be from surveillance cameras (such as the well-known, lower-
cost Dropcams). In addition, as indicated in Section I, video
surveillance operating within Smart Cities [16] are likely
to be a major source of surveillance traffic, especially as
that surveillance video data, within the architecture of the
IoT [17], after a perception layer (or similar) is likely, in
a network layer (or similar) to be passed on to cloud data
centers [18] across the conventional Internet, before video
analytics, in an application layer, takes place. Because the
security needs of the IoT and the conventional Internet are not
the same, because of the types of devices and the organization
of the networks within each, there is a need to integrate the
security provision within each [19].
Thus, video streams generated by surveillance systems
have become one of the significant contributors to a massive
amount of multimedia data moving across computer-based
systems. Consequently, a suitable approach to tackle these
issues is required and that approach could be through suit-
able abstraction technologies, such as semantic content rep-
resentation or context-aware perceptual modeling or through
ontologies. In recent years, context-aware, ontological-based,
perceptual modeling approaches have been adopted in the
video surveillance application [20]–[24] (see Section II.B)
and information security [25]–[27] domains. Ontologies
enable the content description of basic categories within the
domain and relations among them to make them machine
understandable [28]. Indeed, the description of the associated
concepts of domain by context-aware, perceptual modelling
for intelligent systems increases the accuracy of the indexing
process.
A. FEATURE OF INTEREST (FOI) DETECTION
Feature of Interest (FOI) or the well-knownRegion of Interest
(ROI) detection is the fundamental process of any Intelligent
Video Surveillance (IVS). The FOI is a sensitive area within
the surveillance video, which needs to be protected to attain
the desired level of security and confidentiality. A FOI could
be any real-world instances within the video such as humans,
faces, animals, motion, all kinds of vehicles, license plates,
background and so on. FOI is often first identified, before
employing different methods to protect the FOI, coupled
with real-time, context-aware processing; including efficient
event recognition, detection, and notification. Researchers
have proposed a plethora of FOI detection techniques using
computer vision and machine learning algorithms. However,
the performance and accuracy of detection algorithms dif-
fer according to environmental conditions, the surveillance
devices utilized, and their positions. The position of the
device affects the Field of View (FOV), detection accuracy
and quality of the captured video footage. Some key chal-
lenges experienced in FOI detection are shadows, illumi-
nation changes, dynamic backgrounds, foreground aperture,
noise, camera jitter, image blurring, slow motion of moving
objects, low-quality footage and low resolution [29]. For
static installations of surveillance cameras, generally, each
frame of a video is categorised into two parts: (1) The station-
ary or static part, called the background, and (2) The moving
part, called the foreground. For GDPR compliance, it is not
necessary to encrypt complete video frames if there is no
sensitive data within the non-encrypted parts. So, in MuLViS,
face, human/people (full body), motion, and background are
considered as FOIs at each level. For further clarity, use-case
scenarios are described below:
Use case 1 (Activity protection): In video surveillance
motion is considered to be the most important part of the
video. Motion holds information about spatio-temporal rela-
tionships among objects in the FOV of the camera. In many
cases, fixed video surveillance cameras or visual sensors
are installed at indoor and outdoor locations, such as for
monitoring children and elderly people or groups of people
within a community or in street/parking areas, all with the
purpose ofmonitoring activities for security purposes. In such
scenarios, there is often little activity captured by the cameras.
It is also impossible to implement advanced algorithms on
such limited-resource devices. Moving objects are detected in
only a fraction of the captured videos, though they are suitable
FOIs to implement security measures upon. In fact, motion
can be detected without the implementation of advanced
detection algorithms on such resource-constrained devices.
Thus, in this study motion is considered as an FOI for encryp-
tion of surveillance video datawhen dealingwith simple, low-
resolution videos captured by constrained devices.
During the last decade, several motion-detection
approaches have been proposed for surveillance cameras
[30], [31]. Generally, motion detection can be performed
utilizing three methods: (1) Temporal filtering [32], (2) Back-
ground subtraction [33], and (3) Optical-flow [34]. In the
first method, motion is segmented by calculating the tem-
poral difference between two or more than two consecutive
frames. This is the simplest method to implement. The second
method, i.e. Background subtraction, in which firstly the
background model of the static region is constructed by
comparing pixel-by-pixel absolute differences between con-
secutive frames and then motion is segmented by compared
it with live video frames or reference frames. Any pixel
of the reference frame that deviates significantly from its
previous value is categorized as motion. Alternatively, in the
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optical-flow method, intensity changes of frames over time
relative to camera motion are compared to find estimates of
themotion in a video [34]. The aim of the optical flowmethod
is to distinguish the camera motion patterns from the object
motion patterns in a scene. The pixels that have high-intensity
differences can be classified as moving objects. Thus, this
is a method suitable for dynamic backgrounds. However,
performing optical flow is computationally complex, requires
special hardware and is sensitive to noise [35]. Therefore,
in this work, for motion detection by fixed cameras, temporal
difference between the reference frame and the current frame
is calculated.
Use case 2 (Individual Secrecy): The face as an individual
part of the human body, Human (whole body) and skin the
important feature within the surveillance footage. To provide
for the privacy of individuals at public and private places such
as at parks, airports, bus stations, and shoppingmalls, the face
and human are considered FOIs for encryption. For example,
suppose that a person is situated just in front of a camera
then their face is a sensitive area that needs to be protected
to ensure the privacy of that person. However, if the height of
the camera is too high or the pose variations of the person
such as side-on poses or poses that are not in the FOV of
the camera, then face detection will be unreliable. In such
a scenario, the skin can be considered a sensitive area that
should be protected. However, in the worst-case, the skin may
not be detected, due to a variety of causes such as blurriness,
low resolution, illumination variations or diverse skin tones of
the person within the video scene. Thus, herein, the face and
human (full human body) are considered as FOIs for security
and privacy protection.
Face detection is the process of determining the location
of faces that are present in a video or an image. A variety of
face detection techniques have been presented until now [36].
However, face detection remains a challenging task due to
external factors (illumination condition, orientation, scaling,
FOV, low resolution and so on) and internal factors (facial
expression, pose change, glasses, hair, beard, moustache,
and shade). Face variation creates major difficulties in the
development of an efficient and accurate face detector. The
first face detection algorithm for real-world applications was
presented by Viola and Jones [37]. This detector was and is
based on Haar-like features and a cascade AdaBoost clas-
sifier and is until now widely adopted algorithm [38]. The
authors of [39] utilized Local Binary Patterns (LBP) for face
detection. Some researchers also adopted regional statistics-
based face detection approaches (in the form of histograms),
as proposed in [40]. However, existing state-of-the-art face-
detection methods are not optimized for a complex real-time
environment; thus, they suffer from various problems when
deployed in a surveillance system, such as when there are
dynamic backgrounds, illumination changes, camera jitter
processing and unconstrained conditions (arbitrary variations
in pose and occlusion) is required. Therefore, in work herein,
a Normalized Pixel Difference (NPD) face detector [41]
method has been utilised for face detection because of its
efficiency and accuracy in unconstrained scenarios, such as
illumination variations, out-of-focus imaging, blurring and
low resolutions.
Researchers have presented many different techniques for
human detection such as in [29], [40], [42]–[44]. For instance,
in [42] Dalal et al., proposed Histogram of Flows (HOF),
in which, for human motion encoding, temporal descrip-
tors (features) are defined from optical flows. In [43] the
authors proposed human detection in non-controlled envi-
ronments using Histogram of Oriented Gradient and Gabor
filters (HoGG). Zhou and De la Torre [44] proposed a human
detection model for videos using spatio-temporal matching,
in which the motion of joints was signified by trajectories.
In this study, for human (people) detection, a motion-based
feature is applied using the Histogram of Flows (HOF) pro-
posed by [42] is employed, due to its robustness in an uncon-
strained environment.
Other methods may have similar advantages in terms of
robustness in an unconstrained environment, including those
reviewed in this Section. On the other hand, other recent
machine-learning-based methods have a high training cost
[45]. Thus, in this work [42] is utilized due to its adaptability
to local deformation of the human and to background varia-
tions in the video, as well as low computational complexity
compared to these other algorithms.
Use case 3 (Location Hiding): In a surveillance environ-
ment, individuals may have a strongly-felt objection to losing
their location secrecy at certain locations such as military
bases, banks, police stations, or automobile tolls. In these
scenarios, the location is a sensitive entity that should be
protected. Over the years, researchers have proposed vari-
ous background modeling methods to distinguish the fore-
ground and background in a video. The most extensively used
pixel-based parametric background modeling methods are
the Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM), and Adaptive GMM
(AGMM) [46]. In Mixture of Gaussians (MOG) modeling,
each pixel is modeled by more than one (k) Gaussians per
pixel (multiple Gaussian distributions) to observe the vari-
ations in the color of a pixel in Red-Green-Blue (RGB)
color space at any time t . A pixel frequently observed in the
recent past that does not fit the k distributions is labeled as
foreground. However, in the current study, the MOG2 algo-
rithm is employed, which is based on the work in [47], [48].
In MOG2, k (number of Gaussian distributions) are selected
dynamically for every pixel rather than keeping k constant
throughout. The model is selected for background detection
because it produces robust and efficient results for lower
illumination variations compared to other methods [49].
B. ONTOLOGIES IN VIDEO SURVEILLANCE
To minimize the gap between the results interpreted by an
intelligent system and those perceived by a human from
the multimedia information, ontology-based approaches are
adopted [20]–[24]. In [20], Hernandez-Leal et al. used
ontologies to reduce the semantic gap between low and high-
level information in an IVS system. However, the ontology
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was not integrated with algorithms for intelligent detection,
tracking, and recognition of events. In [21], Tani et al.
presented a Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL)-based
ontology to bridge the semantic-gap problem and detect a
single or multiple objects events in surveillance video. In [22]
Calavia et al. also proposed an intelligent video surveillance
ontology system to analyze object movements and recog-
nize abnormal circumstances. However, the proposed system-
domain application was not consistent with the ontology’s
representation. Pahal et al. also presented [23] an ontology-
based system for situation tracking in a smart surveillance
environment using Dynamic Bayesian Networks (DBNs).
In general, the literature shows that a common perspective
adopted by researchers in order to design context-aware intel-
ligent systems is focused on the indexing process to support
object detection, event detections, traffic monitoring, and
abnormal behavior detection and analysis. Notice also that
such systems are also employed to provide humans with a
way to analyze the reasoning process made by the system that
can serve different kinds of analyses.
However, unfortunately, automatic, context-aware repre-
sentation along with security concepts in the constrained but
dynamic Mobile IoT (MIoT) has received nominal attention
up to now. In [24], Martínez et al. considered the anonymiza-
tion of categorical datasets through semantic information
by employing methods from Statistical Disclosure Control
(SDC), such as recoding, micro-aggregation, and resampling.
These methods were then adapted to take into account the
semantics of the data they were protecting relying on ontolo-
gies to model the semantic knowledge associated with the
attributes of the dataset. In [50], a multi-layer cloud archi-
tectural model was developed to provide better service using
an ontology, by enabling secure seamless interactions among
heterogeneous devices in smart homes. This research work
also demonstrated that ontology-based methods provide bet-
ter solutions for the heterogeneity problem and that high-
security and privacy can be ensured within smart homes.
In [51], researchers developed a context platform, Kali-
Smart, by incorporating an ontology to collect contextual
information from sensors for adapting system behavior and
semantic event detection and to provide services to clients
in a ubiquitous environment. Recently in [45], a knowledge-
based modeling of a UAV recorded video scenario was intro-
duced. In the proposed scheme, Semantic Web technologies
are utilized to design ontology-based multi-layer knowledge
schema for the target detection and description rather than
using only classification methods. Through the proposed
schema, a high level of abstraction of a scene has been
achieved.
Nevertheless, research on integrating the semantic reason-
ing and security approaches appear to still be in its infancy
and existing studies on this topic are probably insufficient.
Thus, in the current paper, an ontology-based security system
for the surveillance videos has been implemented that can
recognize, analyze and store surveillance video content, along
with providing video stream confidentiality with respect to
device storage and processing capability. In the security sys-
tem, a context-aware ontology, that is SSSO, has been devel-
oped to represent the domain knowledge of videos, hetero-
geneous devices, and their device-specific security concepts,
along with the relationships among them. The SSSO makes
the classification of video content easier for the MuLViS sys-
tem and improves the effectiveness of device-specific security
adaptation.
C. SECURITY IN VIDEO SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS
Related work on protection approaches for video surveillance
can be divided into two categories: Non-scrambling based
protection methods and Scrambling based protection meth-
ods. In the Scrambling based protection methods, the video
footage is encrypted using various cryptographic methods,
whereas non-scrambling methods the sensitive region is
protected without utilising the cryptographic methods. The
scrambling based protection methods are considered more
efficient and secure; thus, in this paper, the latter method is
adopted. More recently, the authors Ciftci et al. [52] proposed
reversible privacy protection for static images in which the
original colour information of entire frames is replaced with
some other colour palette information called false colours.
It is a reversible technique, and the replaced false colours can
be reversed back to the original.
In another work, Hoo et al. [53] presented a privacy fil-
ter framework in which human skin regions are detected
by incorporating various current skin-detection methods and
detected skin regions are removed from the video to achieve
privacy protection. Wang et al. [54] proposed a privacy pro-
tection scheme for ubiquitous surveillance systems, in which
intra prediction modes (IPM) are encrypted along with the
SNC within the privacy region. In the proposed scheme,
to avoid the drift error and to reduce the BR overhead,
the re-encoding method is integrated along with the spi-
ral binary mask mechanism. Moreover, the encryption is
performed using Rabbit stream cipher. Xiaojing et al. [55]
applied complete encryption on the face region to obliterate it,
so that, no one could reveal the identity of the person present
within the surveillance video. Though that scheme did not
obscure all the information in the video frame, nevertheless
the behaviour of a person is no longer perceptible. In contrast,
scheme proposed in this paper preserves the structure of a pro-
tected sensitive region. Hence, the solution proposed in this
work can be used for behaviour analysis, without revealing
the identities of people.
Moreover, most prior proposals for privacy in real-time
IVS systems proposed by researchers focus on more narrow
techniques rather than abstraction technologies. For example,
Carillo et al. [56] proposed a selective encryption scheme
(one in which only visually significant semantic elements
are encrypted) in which pixels in the ROIs are permutated
before compression. The scheme ensured format compliance
at the decoder (allowing intermediate processing of encrypted
regions without decryption) but it is known that compression
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efficiency significantly declines when encryption is applied
before compression due to the loss of exploitable redundancy.
Then, in another example, Ahmad et al. [57] proposed a
real-time, occupancy-monitoring system with ROIs in which
images of people present in the video are encrypted with an
advanced encryption method (Tangent Delay Ellipse Reflect-
ing Cavity Map). However, the usability and adaptation of
this system and, for that matter, the method of [56], did
not take into account current surveillance systems, which
exist in an environment where heterogeneous devices are the
norm. The design of a self-optimizing, context-driven, and
energy-aware IoT wireless video sensor node for surveillance
applications is presented by [58]. Another recent work [59],
proposed distributed three-layered architectural framework
named IoT-guard for the real time crime detection and secu-
rity management within the smart home surveillance system
while conserving the resources usage such as energy, band-
width, storage and CPU usage. The proposed framework is
an event-driven video surveillance system in which edge-and
fog-integrated approach employed. For the crime detection
and confirmation, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and an event-
driven approach are utilized.
Moreover, many organizations have started to incorporate
multilevel policies into their systems. Examples of these are
the access-control policies implemented in Microsoft Vista
and Red Hat Linux. Multi-Level Security (MLS) concepts
were started within military systems [60], in which informa-
tion was classified into confidential, secret, and top secret.
Researchers have utilized these concepts in their hardware
and software systems in a number of ways. For example,
in [61], researchers incorporated MLS into real-time systems
so as to integrate system requirements and the implementa-
tion environment, thus enhancing the performance of those
systems and their associated security measures.
Table 1 is a comparative summary of a variety of existing
systems appearing in the text, as well as the proposed system
of this paper. It is difficult to make a direct comparison as,
for example, each system has a different FOI. However, some
things stand out such as only one system has a moving node
and only two systems achieve data confidentiality.
III. PROPOSED MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY SYSTEM
The context-aware MuLViS system is shown in Figure 1. The
system has eight main modules namely: (1) Data Acquisition;
(2) Device virtualization; (3) Real-time preprocessing. (It is
in this module that the environmental context in respect, for
example, to camera position and ambient lighting, is taken
into account.); (4) Ontology modeling and reasoning; (5)
Feature adaptation and security encoding; (6) Video chunking
and tagging; (7) Lightweight encryption; and (8) Informa-
tion retrieval modules. The details of the framework and its
modules are explained below. The framework is suitable for
decision-making for the security of surveillance data, based
on storage device attributes. Sensors are used to extract the
information about the end-device type, including the capabil-
ities of sensors.
A. DATA ACQUISITION MODULE
In this module, the raw surveillance data (i.e. video frames)
are captured from heterogeneous data sources, such as fixed
CCTV cameras and smart cameras (Raspberry Pi cameras
in our case). Initially, the footage output from the camera
is stored in the camera’s own registers as frames and some
minor pre-processing such as flipping (horizontal and verti-
cal), line skipping, and pixel binning happens within those
registers. After that, the frames are transferred to the real-
time preprocessing module for further processing and feature
extraction, such as extracting features which might be faces,
human bodies, or the background).
B. DEVICE VIRTUALIZATION MODULE
It is important to identify the attributes/characteristics of the
devices within the surveillance system. Therefore, the iden-
tification of devices (surveillance and storage devices) and
information about their attributes (storage, processing, and
power) are explicitly acquired from sensors, which are
installed on the surveillance devices. These device attributes,
such as device identification number, device category, storage
capacity, and processing power, are provided as an input to
the ontology module for context-aware categorization and
automatic mapping of device-specific attributes and security-
level recommendations.
C. REAL TIME PRE-PROCESSING MODULE
The pre-processing module performs a low-level analysis of
the raw data (video frames) acquired from the data acquisition
module for Feature of Interest (FOI) selection. The process-
ing unit, which may be within the same device or maybe
outside the device connected by a network, first processes the
raw surveillance data for FOI extraction. In the work herein,
preliminary face detection, motion detection, human detec-
tion, and background selection are considered as FOIs. Fea-
ture extraction is performed by applying efficient, computer
vision and background subtraction techniques. For motion
detection by fixed cameras, firstly, the video current frames
are divided into non-overlapping MBs of 16 × 16 pixels at
a particular time interval T-1 for Motion Estimation (ME).
After that a comparison is performed of the block position in
the current frame Fi at time T with either the previous Fi− k
frame or the next frame Fi + k , where k is the number of the
frame used to compare with the present video frame. When
the block matches with the block of the reference frame,
motion vectors are generated. Moreover, in this work, the last
frame is subtracted from the present frame and the resid-
ual frame Motion Vector Difference (MVDs) are calculated.
The number of MVDs is dependent on the motion within
a video. Background detection is performed by the optimal
MOG2 [48], [49] method. The methods implemented in the
processing module are chosen because of their robustness
and efficiency compared to other background subtraction
algorithms.
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FIGURE 1. Architecture of the Multi-Level Video Security (MuLViS) system.
TABLE 1. Comparison of other existing systems with the proposed model.
Besides, in this paper, for human (people) detection, a
motion-based feature is applied using the Histogram of Flows
(HOF) proposed in [42]. The algorithm is employed due
to its adaptability to local deformation of the human and
background variations in the video and its low computa-
tional complexity compared to other algorithms. In this work,
the oriented gradients of both the boundary motion descrip-
tors that describe motion vectors at body edges (boundary
vectors) and also internal motion descriptors that describe
motion vectors within the internal regions (including the rela-
tive movements vectors of different parts of the human body,
e.g. left vs. right hand or leg,) are horizontally and vertically
extracted fromSpatio-temporal derivatives relative to the sub-
sequent frame. A separate histogram is built for each and then
combined with the Histogram of Oriented Gradient (HOG)
descriptors. The temporal difference is estimated indepen-
dently at each over a small N×N neighborhood. After that, a
linear Support VectorMachine (SVM) classifier, working as a
baseline classifier, is used to classify the extracted descriptor
into human and non-human descriptors. For a more detailed
description, interested readers are encouraged to read [42].
The advantage of the SVM classifier is that it is fast to run
compared to the other linear classifiers. Likewise, existing
state-of-the-art face-detection methods are not optimized for
a real-time complex environment; thus, they suffer from
various problems when deployed in a surveillance system,
such as when there are dynamic backgrounds, illumination
changes, and camera jitter processing is required. Therefore,
in the work herein, a Normalized Pixel Difference (NPD)
face detector [41] method has been utilized for face detection
because of its efficiency and accuracy in unconstrained sce-
narios, such as illumination variations, out-of-focus imaging,
blurring, and low resolutions. In the NPD features method,
the relative difference between two pixels is calculated as:
f (a, b) = (a− b)/(a+ b) (1)
where the value of function f (a, b) represents the relative
difference of intensity values of the two pixels ‘a′ and ‘b′
while the sign of the function f (a, b) represents an ordinal
relationship between the two pixels. A zero value represents
that there is no difference between the two pixels.
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FIGURE 2. Overview of the state-of-art algorithms applied for feature
extraction.
A summary of the algorithms applied to feature extraction
is illustrated in Figure. 2. Notably, the followingmethods par-
ticularly MOG2 is employed because they are characterized
by their high precision and low false positive rates in dynamic
background and difficult challenging scenarios such as vari-
ous illumination conditions, bad weather, and low frame rate
[62]. The extracted low-level data is subsequently passed to
the ontology module to interpret meaningful semantic knowl-
edge for data fusion and reasoning. Additionally, this module
automatically generates a real-time autonomous response to
communicate without delay between the end devices.
D. ONTOLOGICAL MODELING AND REASONING MODULE
As previously mentioned, within the Ontological Modeling
and Reasoning Module, a Smart Surveillance Security Ontol-
ogy (SSSO) has the purpose of autonomously selecting the
privacy level that matches a device’s hardware specifica-
tions and network capabilities. To achieve this processing
passes through two phases: 1) Ontology modeling and 2)
Ontological reasoning. In the ontological modeling phase,
the ontology is structured to formalize the basic concepts
(specification of objects), attributes of concepts, and the rela-
tionships between these concepts. In the ontological reason-
ing phase, the aforementioned ontologies, their description
and the relation among the sub-domain are taken as the
reasoning objects in the reasoning engine to achieve auto-
matic security-level selection for heterogeneous surveillance
devices. In terms of implementation of these two phases,
in particular, video domain concepts and device-specific
security concepts are integrated. We now treat separately
each, of these two phases, ontological modelling and reason-
ing, in more detail.
Ontological Modelling: Thus in the SSSO modelling
phase, firstly the security ontology is constructed by classify-
ing the devices in operation through the instance similarities
and semantic similarities andmaking them an SSSO instance.
After that, the related concepts are associated/mapped to
the security level in the security ontology. Subsequently,
the device-specific security concepts are mapped to the multi-
media domain ontology to finally establish the SSSO. There-
fore, through the SSSO, a set of correlated video and device
concepts abstracted from the surveillance video scenario are
structured.
The concepts are classified into a top-layer and low-layer
hierarchical structure. The top-layer structure captures five
high-level, generalized concepts, which are defined asPlaces,
Objects, Motion, Security, and Storage_Media, as shown
in Figure 3. Further, these top-level generalized concepts are
divided into their associated sub-concepts in the low-level
hierarchy.
FIGURE 3. The top level structure of the Secure Smart Surveillance
Ontology (SSSO).
In the current study, for the ontological development,
the Web Ontology Language (OWL) is used in Protégé [63].
Protégé is employed because it is an extensible, and platform-
independent. It also supports a variety of formats to construct
and edit ontologies. For the interested reader, a code ‘snippet’
for the ontology of the SSSO can be found in Figure 4.
The details of the general concepts and their features in
each sub-domain are defined in the low-level structure of
SSSO. Storage_Media is the abstraction for device entities
of a VS system. This sub-domain can then direct which
security measure is required to be taken in the surveillance
video. The Storage_Media and its low-level concepts are
illustrated in Figure 5. Moreover, the basic device informa-
tion is defined by Device_ID, Device_Name, Device_Type,
Storage_Capacity, Processing_Memory, and Power_Battery.
In the Security concept, the associated low-level sub-
concepts, defined as Level_1, Level_2, Level_3, Level_4,
and Level_5, are shown in Figure 6. The attributes of
security and their related entities are defined as Level_ID,
Level_Name. Moreover, the Security concept and its sub-
concepts are linked with the Motion, Objects and Places sub-
domains defined in the SSSO for FOI selection. Level_1 has
a minimum security policy while Level_5 has the highest
security policy. Thus, the Security sub-domain corresponds
to Storage_Media as well as Motion, Objects, and Places
sub-domains for managing and automatic device-specific
security-level selection.
Ontological Reasoning: The proper selection of param-
eters is an important factor for the accurate selection of
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FIGURE 4. Code snippet for the SSSO.
FIGURE 5. Storage_Media concept and its low-level concepts.
the appropriate security-level in a real-time and dynamic
environment. In the work herein, to define the reasoning
rules for the automatic selection of the security level by the
reasoning engine and extract the relevant knowledge from the
ontology, the Semantic Query-EnhancedWeb Rule Language
(SQWRL) [64] is used. The automatic reasoning engine
will take the following steps for security-level selection, by
considering the necessary conditions. The Reasoning Rules
defined for automatic security level selection are illustrated
in Figure 7.
FIGURE 6. Security concept and its low-level concepts and their
relationship with FOI.
1. The Storage_Media is a superclass that has differ-
ent devices in its sub-classes. Therefore, the Device_ID,
Device_Type (t) and Storage_Capacity (s) are captured and
then the Storage_ Capacity is compared with the predefined
storage threshold and classified as very limited, limited,
medium, high, or unlimited.
2. Since devices in Storage_Media have different battery
power, which is another important attribute, Power_Battery
(p) is measured and then the Power_Battery (p) is compared
with the predefined Power threshold and classified as very
limited, or low.
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FIGURE 7. Reasoning Rules for Security Level Selection.
3. The Storage_Media superclass supports various data-
transfer rates. Therefore, Throughput (r) is measured and
then compared with the pre-defined Throughput (r) threshold
ranges and classified as very low, low, medium, or high.
4. The Network class has the properties of Network_ID
and Network_Bandwith, therefore, the Network_Bandwidth
(b) is captured and compared with the predefined Bandwidth
threshold and classified as low, medium, or high.
5. Finally, from the obtained resultant classifica-
tion of Storage_Capacity (s), Processing Memory (m),
Power_Battery (p), Throughput (r), and Network_Bandwidth
(b) obtained from the above steps, the reasoner in the reason-
ing engine will identify which Security_Level (x) should be
selected.
Moreover, the threshold values of selected param-
eters/characteristics of devices are explicitly classified
(using an expert-derived evaluation) as very small, small,
large, or unlimited for device storage [GB], battery power
[watts], and throughput [Mbps], and bandwidth [MHz]
parameters. The power consumption is considered when the
devices are in active states. Thus by expert-derived evalu-
ation, the device-specific parameters values are defined as
follows:
Critical (Storage capacity ≤ 1 GB)
Low (Storage capacity > 1 GB and ≤ 64 GB)
Medium (Storage capacity > 64 GB and ≤ 500 GB)
Large (Storage capacity > 500 GB and ≤ 10 TB)
Unlimited (Storage capacity > 10 TB)
The values for power consumption are defined on the basis
of the following expert-derived characteristics:
Critical (Power consumption ≤ 5 Watts)
Low (Power consumption > 5 Watts and ≤ 15 Watts)
Medium (Power consumption > 15 Watts and≤ 50 Watts)
High (Power consumption > 50 Watts and ≤ 75 Watts)
Very High (Power consumption > 75)
The values for network capabilities are define low, medium
and high on the basis of the following expert-derived charac-
teristics:
Low (Bandwidth ≤ 2.5 Mbps)
Medium (Bandwidth > 2.5 Mbps ≤ 100 Mbps)
High (Bandwidth > 100 Mbps)
Furthermore, the privacy value is defined as ranging
between high and low. The security levels defined based on
the above-mentioned device and network specific parame-
ters along with the privacy levels are listed in Table 2. For
the interested reader, the parameter threshold ranges for the
Storage capacity attribute of the Storage_Media class in the
implementation of the framework are given in Appendix A.
As an example, a use case scenario assumes that there is a
device, belonging to the Storage_Media class, reports its stor-
age capacity as 0.5 [GB], battery power 3 [Watts], throughput
2 [Mbps], and bandwidth 2.5 [Mhz]. Following the aforemen-
tioned steps, in the first step, storage capacity is classified as
critical by comparing the reported value, which is 0.5, with
the storage threshold. In the second step, the battery power
is classified as critical, comparing the reported value 3 with
the threshold. Similarly, the throughput and bandwidth are
classified as very low and low respectively in the third and
fourth steps. Finally, taking all these findings, the reasoner
selects Level_1 for the security class. The selected security
level is provided as input in feature selection in the security-
encoding module.
E. FEATURE SELECTION AND SECURITY ADAPTATION
MODULE
The feature selection and security adaption module is respon-
sible for FOI selection by taking the security level selected
by the reasoning engine as input. In MuLViS, FOI (i.e.
motion, texture, face, skin, human/people (full body), and
background) adaptation concerning device characteristics at
each security level is described below and shown in Table 2.
L1 Security: In this study, motion is considered as an
FOI at L1 for encryption of surveillance video data when
dealing with simple, low-resolution videos captured by con-
strained devices. One form of selective encryption [65] is
to encrypt only certain syntax elements output by the final
stage, the entropy coder, of a compression codec, such as
H.264/Advanced Video Coding (AVC) [66] or High Effi-
ciency Video Coding (HEVC) [67]. Therefore, additionally,
to further reduce the computational complexity of encryption
only syntax elements Motion Vector Difference (MVD) at
L1 are selected for encryption.
L2 Security: Texture Coefficients (TC) at level 2 are
encrypted. Restricting encryption to MVD and/or TC syntax
elements also achieves compression decoder format com-
pliance (with the requirements of the standardized codec)
together with an on average reduction in the bitrate overhead
from encrypting the video.
L3 Security: To protect the privacy of individuals, the face
and human are considered FOI for encryption at L3. However,
if the height of the camera is too high or the pose variations
of the person such as side-on poses or poses that are not in
the FOV of the camera or due to a variety of causes such as
blurriness, low resolution, illumination variations then face
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detection will be unreliable or will not be detected within
the video scene. In such a scenario, herein, human (full
human body) are considered as FOIs for security and privacy
protection at L3.
L4 Security: In the model, the background at L4 is con-
sidered as an FOI, to protect the privacy of the location.
L5 Security: At L5 partial-full security is employed for the
protection for resources sufficient devices
Moreover, In the model, devices at levels above LI and
L2 might be lumped together so that in devices at levels L3,
L4 and L5, advanced object detection and background sub-
traction algorithms can be implemented to achieve sufficient
security at the respective level.
F. VIDEO CHUNKING AND TAGGING MODULE
In this module, chunking and tagging are implemented. In
chunking, similar FOI is grouped into chunks and then tag-
ging with semantic descriptors defined in the SSSO is per-
formed. This makes it possible for a user to quickly search
for the desired video chunk and quickly have access to that
chunk.
G. LIGHTWEIGHT PARTIAL ENCRYPTION MODULE
In this module, the tagged video chunk is encrypted by
partial encryption, i.e. only FOI encryption, to secure the
surveillance information. Thus, in this way, partial encryption
will ensure its effectiveness in reducing computational and
memory costs because the data encrypted is reduced in size in
comparisonwith encrypting all of the video data. In this work,
partial encryption on an FOI is implemented by applying the
well-known industry standard symmetric cipher, Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) [70] in Output Feedback (OFB)
operating mode, i.e. in a stream cipher mode, as described
shortly. Partial encryption only takes place on selected part
of a video frame, reducing the impact of AES encryption,
which can be computationally expensive. The computational
complexity issue of AES relative to lightweight ciphers is
addressed by implementing partial encryption with the AES
block-based encryption, similar to that previously proposed
by the author [69], [70] of the current paper, which is a rela-
tively lightweight form of encryption. Thus, the current paper
is a more suitable choice for resource-constrained devices.
Advanced Encryption Standard: AES (also known
as Rijndael) has been widely deployed as an encryption
standard since 2000. AES is considered to be a secure
industry-standard cipher and, hence, is extensively utilized
for confidentiality in cyber-physical systems [71]. AES is
extensively used because of its security, ease of implementa-
tion, defense against threats, flexibility in the case of encryp-
tion/decryption and keying material. AES is a symmetric key
block cipher, which uses a 128-bit key for 10 rounds, a 192-bit
key for 12 rounds, or a 256-bit key for 14 rounds of operation.
AES processes data in the form of 4 × 4 matrix known as
states. In AES, every round comprises four stages/phases:
(1) Byte-substitution, (2) Mix Columns, (3) Shift Rows and
(4) Add Round Key. As AES is a symmetric block cipher,
so a single key is used for the encryption and decryption
processes. It also considered a robust algorithm that can resist
many attacks.
The symmetric encryption keys are generated at run-time
for each protected video, by using a pseudo-random func-
tion (PRF). Furthermore, 128-bit key is secure enough as in
current computing powers a key space greater than 2100 is
considered resilient to brute-force and key guessing attacks
over keys [72]. Key security can be further enhanced by
using an established chaos-based key randomization scheme
[73] or by standard key management schemes [74] in future.
(Presently, key security is not emphasized, as it will also
increase the computational cost of using Raspberry Pi based
surveillance devices, with current maximum processor speed
of only 1.6 GHz.)
Output Feedback (OFB): AES can be implemented from
a choice of multiple operational modes [75]. This research
implemented the AES with OFB mode of operation as OFB
has the same code for both encryption and decryption pro-
cess, resultantly saves the coding space. Another reason of
choosing AES with OFB mode is that it also operates as
a stream cipher (rather than a block cipher), in which few
bits/bytes can be encrypted rather than a complete block.
In OFB, Xt−1 is an input block from the t-1 stage, which
has been AES encrypted, using secure key Ks. Then Xt−1 is
again AES encrypted using keyKs to produceXt . After thatXi
and the next plaintext block Pt are XORed together to output
encrypted block Ct. For encryption of the following plaintext
block, AES encryption with Ke is again performed on the Xt
of the previous stage to produce Xt+1, and then XORing is
performed with the plaintext Pt+1 to output Ct+1 and so on.
Moreover, OFB generates different outputCt for the identical
input Pt because of the random initialization vector IV. The
following equations represent the encryption and decryption
processes in OFB mode, respectively.
Ct = PtXORXt (2)
Pt = CtXORXt (3)
where t=1, 2,3, . . . . . . .n, for n stages of block encryption, and
Xt = {Encrypt ( Ke(Xt−1))}
Any modifications to a plaintext block Pi are reflected in
the corresponding ciphered block Ct , where t = 1, 2, 3. . .n
with n the number of plaintext blocks, but other ciphered
blocks remain unaffected. The OFB mode is error-resilient in
that if any modification/error occurs during the transmission,
that error is not propagated. Therefore, AES-OFB is suitable
for real-time smart surveillance applications.
In fact, surveillance systems usually transport video in a
compressed form. However, compression latency then occurs
because of compression computation. Therefore, in surveil-
lance real-time applications, H.264/AVC is now widely
adopted for surveillance [76], rather than HEVC, due to its
low latency (4 ms to 8 ms on average per video frame) and
relatively higher compression ratio (50% or more). Once
multi-level FOI encryption has taken place, the encrypted
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TABLE 2. FOI adaptation with respect to security level.
TABLE 3. Summary of test videos configuration.
video stream is then stored in the surveillance database for
future use.
H. INFORMATION RETRIEVAL MODULE
In this final module, the required information can be retrieved
in an encrypted form. The original information can be viewed
after decryption with the cipher key. Consequently, only
authorized person(s) can view sensitive and private data.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS & DISCUSSION
This Section firstly describes the experimental setup and then
the results of implementing the framework.
A. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The MuLViS was implemented as an in-house built sim-
ulator, using the C++ programming language. To show
the feasibility of the proposal, MuLViS was tested on a
general-purpose laptop, with Intel Core i5 CPU. The sys-
tem is evaluated on publicly-available datasets, derf’s collec-
tion (https://media.xiph.org/video/derf/), Urban Tracker [77]
PETS2009 [78], MOT17 [79] and ABODA [80]. Representa-
tive video frames for each dataset are shown in Figure 8. Pixel
resolution is another important consideration, as VS systems
operate across a wide range of resolutions and frame rates.
Higher resolution provides a better-quality bitstream, which
enhances the ability to identify people and objects within
surveillance videos. However, higher resolution video places
a greater demand on network bandwidth, storage space, and
energy consumption. Thus, in this work, experiments were
performed on datasets of various resolutions (QCIF, CIF,
VGA, EDTV, SVGA, qHD, HD, FHD) (see Table 3) and
frame rates (ranging from 7 to 30 frames/s (fps)). The original
MP4, AVI format video containers were processed in the
YUV file format. FOI detection and encryption algorithms
were implemented in an IPPPBB. . . frame structure with
Group of Pictures (GOP) size of 16 frames and quantization
parameter (QP) of 32 (refer to [81] for frame structure terms).
For the FOI detection, the implemented detection schemes
were discussed in Section III.3. To measure the impact of
partial encryption on FOIs, the set of surveillance videos
listed in Table 3 were used.
B. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The different hardware and network related attributes of
devices in operation are collected through the sensors. The
devices in operation are represented by the Device_id (as d1,
d2, d3 and so on). After that, for real-time device-specific
security level selection data generated by a sensor is used
to simulate the test results of the method. Through semantic
mapping, an instance of the SSSO is stored into owl files,
where the security concepts are mapped/integrated and their
corresponding relationships themultimedia domain concepts.
(Figure 4 briefly indicates the structure of the SSS ontol-
ogy, as discussed in Section III.4.) After that, the auto-level
selection is simulated and results are illustrated in Table 4.
The rules defined for security level selection in the onto-
logical reasoner were described in Section III.4. Column
10 with bold values in Table 4 represents the appropriate level
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FIGURE 8. Representative test videos from benchmark datasets. (a-b) Videos from Xiph, (c-d) Videos from ABODA dataset, (e-f)
PETS2009 dataset, (g-h) Videos from Urban Tracker, (i-j) Videos from MOT17 dataset and (k) Cricket video.
selected by the proposed method to protect the video with
respect to (w.r.t.) device specifications.
After taking the resultant security level as input, encryp-
tion with the AES was implemented on the test videos to
protect confidentially/privacy within the surveillance video
bit-stream. Detailed visual results with FOI encryption at L1,
L2, L3, L4 and L5 are given in Figures 9, 10, and 11. Visual
results at L1 are presented in Figure 9b, 10b and 11b. L2 is
shown in Figures 9c, 10c and 11c. L3 is shown in Figure 9
(d, e), Figure 10 (d, e) and Figure 11 (d, e). L4 is shown in
Figures 9f, 10f and 11f and finally L5 appears in Figures 9g,
10g and 11g.
The results illustrate that the visual quality of an encrypted
video stream declines significantly relative to the original
videos. However, FOI encryption does not completely disrupt
the video stream, as, in a real-time surveillance system, it can
be beneficial to view content of low-sensitivity. Indeed, a low-
quality preview of the actions performed by the objects within
a video may allow event recognition to be performed without
breaching the privacy of individuals.
To support the visual results illustrated previously and
evaluate the quality of encrypted videos, objective quality
analysis was performed by calculating the Peak Signal to
Noise Ratio (PSNR) [82], Mean Square Error (MSE) and
Structural Similarity (SSIM) index [83], [84]. Comparative
PSNR, SSIM and MSE results of FOI encrypted bitstream
for each security level (L1, L2, L3, L4, and L5) are provided
in Table 5. A lower PSNR value indicates a greater distortion
within the video. The results demonstrate that the average
PSNR of FOI encrypted video streams at all security levels
remain below 40 dB which implies sufficient security and
protection has been achieved. Moreover, the results show
that the average PSNR of motion encrypted FOI for the
luma component (Y) is on average 19.04 dB and for the
chroma components U and V [41] is on average 33.02 dB
and 33.3 dB respectively for the MOT17-09 video. The low
luma value of all motion encrypted bitstreams (less than
25 dB) demonstrates that considerable security has been
achieved with a negligible bitrate overhead for constrained
devices at L1.
Likewise, the average SSIM andMSE ofmotion-encrypted
FOI presented in Table 5 lead to the same conclusions as
for PSNR measurement. The privacy of individuals has been
taken into account by considering the face and human (full
body) at L3 (refer to Use Case 2). If the detection algorithm
failed to detect the face (see Figure 10d) due to real-time fac-
tors such as camera location, zooming, and FOV, or various
lighting and environmental conditions, then, in these scenar-
ios, humans (see Figure10e) is selected as an FOI. Besides,
at L3, FOI encryption (i.e. only face encrypted, only skin
encrypted or human encrypted) leads to the privacy protection
of individuals, while preserving their shape/structure (see
Figure 10d and Figure10e). The latter helps in event/action
recognition within the scene.
C. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This Section contains a detailed performance evaluation of
the system.
1) FOI DETECTION ACCURACY ANALYSIS
To assess the encryption accuracy aspect of the system,
the detection percentage was calculated. The average face
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FIGURE 9. Visual results of Multi-Level FOI detection and encryption on the MOT17-09 video.
TABLE 4. Resulting security levels w.r.t devices in operation in a surveillance system.
detection rate as a percentage using the NPD face detector
[38] algorithm adopted in this study (see Section III.3), for
selected frames of the MOT17-09 video sequence is shown
in Table 6. Table 7 averages the face detection rate for a
number of reference video sequences. To compute the detec-
tion percentage of faces in the test videos, the True Positive
Rate (TPR) and False Discovery Rate (FDR) are calculated
by processing each frame of the video stream as (4) and (5).
TPR = TP/P (4)
FDR = FP/(FP+ TP) (5)
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TABLE 5. Average distortion in term of PSNR, SSIM and MSE for FOI encryption of sample surveillance videos.
where ‘TP’ is the number of true positives i.e. number of
faces correctly identified and encrypted, ‘FP’ is the number
of false positives i.e. number of faces incorrectly identified
and encrypted’ and P is the total number of faces within the
frame. The Precision is the proportion of the true positives
results against all positive results and calculated as (6). The
Accuracy is calculated as (7) for the test videos.
Precision = TP/(TP+ FP) (6)
Accuracy = (TP+ TN )/(TP+ FP+ TN + TP) (7)
Likewise, the human count accuracy over the entire
video was measured by investigating the missed number
of human/people and incorrectly detected human. For the
human count accuracy, the Measurement Multiple Object
Count (MOC) metric is utilized. MOC is calculated as [85]:
MOC = 1− ((fn + fp)/Tf ) (8)
where fn is the total number of humans not identi-
fied or missed and fp is the total number of incorrectly
detected humans, whereas, ‘T ′f is the number of humans
(ground truth) present in the entire video. The average
human count accuracy of the sample test videos appears
TABLE 6. Average Face detection rate (%) of MOT17-09 video.
in Figure 12. The results show that the performance of the
method for human detection is better in the test videos where
detection accuracy has an average of ≈ 89.9 %. Therefore,
where the face detection algorithm suffers when faces are
blurred, out of focus, or the camera capturing the video
is installed far away (at a long distance or at a height)
from the surveillance location (refer to Use Case 2 and
see Figure 11 (d)) than human is selected for sufficient
security at L3.
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FIGURE 10. Visual results of multi-level FOI detection and encryption on the Cricket video.
TABLE 7. Average face detection rate (%) for 100 frames of a number of
reference video sequences.
2) ENCRYPTION SPACE RATIO ANALYSIS
To evaluate the performance of the system, the average
Encryption Space Ratio (ESR), i.e. the ratio of bits encrypted
to bits not encrypted in a selective or partial encryption
scheme, see [86] or [87] for an example of ESR in use. The
average ESR of sample test videos for each level is provided
in Table 8. For more clarity, the ESR for MOT17-09 is
illustrated in Figure. 13. It can be noticed from Figure 13 that
the average ESR of only the motion syntax element encrypted
at L1 for constrained devices is only 0.04 %, i.e. scarcely any
bits, as a proportion of the whole, are encrypted.
The comparative results are shown in Table 8 imply that the
ESR of the FOI (i.e. with onlyMVD encryption) at L1 is very
small for all the videos. However, the results also illustrate
that the ESR of background encryption is much higher (an
average of ∼ 86%) as compared to the ESR of the FOIs
encrypted at L1, L2, and L3. However, in some scenarios,
the background is considered to be a sensitive FOI (refer to
Use Case 3). Hence, the background is considered as an FOI
but only for devices with considerable resources and with
high computational performance (see Figures. 9 (f), 10 (f) and
11 (f)).
3) BITRATE OVERHEAD ANALYSIS
Furthermore, FOI encryption has different bitrate overhead
impacts at every security level. The bitrate overhead as a
result of encryption for smart devices should be negligible,
as compared to that of medium to very high storage capacity
devices. Thus, the estimated bitrate overhead on average for
each video at each level is illustrated in Figure 14. The results
imply that the encryption performed for low-resource devices
does not generally affect the bitrate. However, encryption
for medium to very high capacity storage devices introduces
some bitrate overhead. Moreover, the encryption overhead
introduced is video content dependent. The results show that
the average bitrate overhead of MOIT09 video stream for
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FIGURE 11. Visual results of multi-level FOI detection and encryption on PETS09-S2L1.
FIGURE 12. Comparison of average human count accuracy over the entire
sample test videos.
only motion and texture encryption (which provides L1 and
L2 security) is zero, for face and human encryption (which
provides L3 security) is an average of 0.24 % and 3.1 %
FIGURE 13. Average ESR at each security level of the MuLViS system for
the MOTI7-09 video.
respectively, which is quite reasonable. However, results
show that bitrate overhead for background (which provides
L4 security) is 8.3 % for the MOT17-09 bit-stream, which is
high as compared to L1 encryption for constrained resources
devices. However, for high resources and high performance
devices this bitrate overhead is manageable.
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TABLE 8. Average ESR at each security level of MuLViS.
FIGURE 14. Comparative average bitrate overhead introduced at each
security level of MuLViS for text videos.
4) TIME COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
Finally, the performance of MuLViS is evaluated in terms
of time complexity. However, notice that these timings are
intended to be indicative rather than definitive, since different
timings could result from employing other hardware than the
laptop specified in Section IV.1. The computational time itself
is calculated by adding the FOI extraction time (for back-
ground, face, motion, human, or objects), the compression
time of the H.264/AVC codec and the absolute encryption
time. The absolute encryption time for each level is illustrated
in Figure 15. The Absolute Encryption Time (AET) is calcu-
lated as:
AET = Total Execution Time− Detection Time (9)
The results show that the AET for security levels L1 and
L2 (i.e. only motion or texture syntax elements are encrypted)
adopted for constrained resources devices is significantly
low, being on average 2.7% of the total execution time (i.e.
motion detection, compression time, and encryption time).
Similarity, the average absolute encryption time ratio is an
FIGURE 15. Average absolute encryption time of Partial FOI encryption.
average of 9.7% of the total execution time of L3 (i.e. human
encrypted) considered for medium capacity resource devices.
While the average absolute encryption time ratio for L4
(background encrypted) adopted for high capacity resource
devices is an average of 16.4 % of the total execution time.
The average absolute encryption time for L5 security (i.e.
partial encryption) adopted for very high capacity resource
devices is an average of 25.2% of total execution time, which
is a significant amount.
The results imply that an additional 2.7% time is needed
for the encryption of selected FOIs (from 1033.43 to 1062.23
seconds) for low capacity devices. That time can easily be
tolerated by the constrained devices. However, the average
absolute encryption time going between low-capacity devices
and very high capacity devices increases from 28.80 to
1959.14 seconds which is significantly higher than the abso-
lute encryption time at L1 and L2 (i.e. only motion or only
faces are encrypted), when adopted for the MOT17-09 video
sequence. The small encryption time reflects the fact that
partial encryption (i.e. full FOI encryption) adopted for low
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capacity device is much simpler, as compared to the measures
adopted for high-performance devices.
5) COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
In this Section, the proposed scheme and other security
approaches proposed by researchers to protect visual content
in a smart infrastructure are compared. Comparison parame-
ters were chosen that indicate the positive features ofMuLViS
in terms of security, as well as how well other schemes
also meet those parameters. The parameters chosen for the
comparison and justifications for their choice are as follows:
Confidentiality: This parameter indicates whether
encryption is applied to the surveillance data or not. Notice
that other forms of privacy protection such as pixila-
tion or blurring can be applied and are applied in a number of
market-based systems. There are many other forms of privacy
protection such as mosaic, masking, and morphing. For a
description of these and other privacy protection methods
refer to [13].
Computational Overhead: Computational overhead
specifies the total processing time required for identifying
and encrypting the FOI (see also Section IV.C.4). A higher
level of computing time means that the computational over-
head is also high and vice versa. A higher computational time
could impede real-time responses or require costly hardware
to achieve a real-time response.
Compression: This implies that compression is applied,
which is an important consideration for network transmission
and storage, particularly as even with compression, video
streams occupy considerable bandwidth and, when stored,
considerable memory.
Format Compliance: This parameter defines whether the
encrypted video sequences are consistent with the standard
for an H.264/AVC or HEVC decoder. Standard compliance
allows intermediate devices in a network path to handle video
streams without a need to decrypt those video streams [82].
Example intermediate devices include: video transcoders to
change the bitrate of a video stream when a network link has
reduced bandwidth and video splicers to insert logos or water-
marks in the compressed domain.
Intelligibility: This indicates whether further processing
(computer vision tasks such as recognitions of events i.e. is
walking, running, fighting etc.) is achievable on protected
videos, without the need for decryption of the protected parts
of a video.
Reversibility: The reversibility parameter indicates
whether the protected video can be decrypted by an autho-
rized person possessing the encryption/decryption key.
Notice that some forms of privacy protection, including
blurring and pixilation are not reversible. This implies that
such video might not be acceptable in a court. Notice also
that encryption is the only reversible protection solution des-
ignated in the articles of the European Union’s GDPR [13].
A comparison of the proposed system against other
approaches is summarized in Table 9. The proposed scheme
meets a good number of the requirements that might be
required for a secure smart surveillance system.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The video data generated by surveillance cameras and sensors
on a daily basis require effective security measures to ensure
data security and privacy. Some prior studies on the crypto-
graphic protection of surveillance video may be insufficient
(though not redundant) because they do not allow both for the
amount of data that must now be processed and the diversity
of devices in operation within the surveillance system. This
work presented an innovative, multi-level security system in
which ontology is integrated for selection of a suitable secu-
rity level. This is achieved by judging a sensor device’s char-
acteristics and network requirements. In that way, at least in
terms of preserving the privacy of objects, people, or locations
within surveillance video streams, the required encryption
processing can be matched to device capabilities and scaled
according to the amount of data that the device is capable
of processing. The proposed framework is a unique blend of
technologies i.e. ontology, computer vision and encryption
over visual data for real-time smart surveillance systems.
Extensive experiments were used to evaluate different
aspects of the performance of the proposed framework. The
objective quality metrics i.e. PSNR, SSIM and MSE were
calculated for statistical visual degradation of videos. The
performance ofMuLViS was evaluated by the detection accu-
racy of all FOI, i.e. face, human, background etc. with respect
to the ESR on each security level. The positive detection
rate of human faces in MOT17-09 video was found to be
86.5% and the false detection rate was 13.7% with the NPD
face detection algorithm. The human accuracy count results
via the MOC metric on all tested videos showed that the
performance of the proposedmethod for human detectionwas
better in the test videos with average detection accuracy ≈
89.9%. ESRwas used as a tool to detect the ratio of encrypted
bits vs. non-encrypted bits of videos on each security level.
The comparative results of average ESR implied that the
ESR of the motion FOI at L1 was just 0.13% (minimal)
for all tested videos while the face and human encryption
at L3 was 1.30% and 4.85% respectively, which was again
quite low and easily computed by constrained surveillance
devices. However, the results also illustrated that the ESR of
background encryption was high (an average of ∼ 86%) as
compared to the ESR of the FOIs encrypted at L1, L2, and
L3. Hence, the background L4 and full partial encryption
L5 can be considered for moderate to high computational
devices.
For the effective computation of MuLViS on smart
cameras, the bit-rate overhead and results with absolute
encryption times were calculated, which were demonstrated
to be manageable for constrained devices for L1, L2, and
L3 security levels. In this paper, the most recent industry
standard cipher AES-OFB with a 128-bit key was imple-
mented to provide a non-breakable secure solution for smart
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TABLE 9. Comparative Evaluation of the Proposed Solution.
surveillance systems. However, AES can be computation-
ally expensive for constrained devices. Therefore, to avoid
the impact of cipher complexity, a single round-cipher, i.e.
real-time eXclusive OR (XOR) cipher can alternatively be
deployed (for moderate security strength) to further reduce
the bit-rate overhead and also reduce the absolute encryption
time.
From all these findings, it can be concluded that this paper
provides a practical solution for privacy-protected surveil-
lance systems in accordance with the current data protection
laws within the EU related to visual surveillance data, namely
the GDPR framework. The novelty of this data protection-by-
design solution is that multi-level privacy protection for each
surveillance video has not so far been targeted by previous
research. All countries in the EU are obliged to comply with
the GDPR. Thus, the proposed solution can be adopted by
Smart Cities with confidence that the solution fulfills the data
protection laws concerned with individuals’ privacy within
Europe.
There is the possibility of enlarging the scope of the ontol-
ogy to include aspects other than encryption. For example,
the level of authentication checks or the level of encryption
key management can be incorporated. It also appears that
computational intelligence may have a role in better select-
ing the security level according to device characteristics.
The whole is a way forward in the context of research into
surveillance and the security that evidently needs to be put in
place. In future work the deep learning based detected algo-
rithms will be incorporated in MuLViS. Alternatively, as a
lighter-weight, real-time reasoning system, fuzzy logic can
be adopted, as it already includes expert-derived modelling
and rules for combining individual models.
APPENDIX A
The parameter threshold ranges for the Storage capacity




^swrl: lessThanOrEqual( (?s,1) -> Critical (?s)
SSSO:Storage_Media(?Device_ID)^hasDevice_Type
(?Device_ID,?t) ^hasStorage_Capacity(?Device_ID, ?s)












^swrl: lessThan( (?s, 80000) ->Unlimited (?s)
The threshold ranges for the Power attribute of Stor-
age_Media are classified as follows:
SSSO:Storage_Media(?Device_ID)^hasDevice_Type
(?Device_ID,?t) ^hasBattery_Power(?Device_ID, ?p)^swrl:
lessThanOrEqual( (?p,5) -> Critical (?p)
SSSO:Storage_Media(?Device_ID)^hasDevice_Type
(?Device_ID,?t) ^hasStorage_Capacity(?Device_ID,?p)












^swrl: lessThan( (?p,75) ->Unlimited (?p)
The threshold ranges for the Throughput attribute of
the Storage_Media class are classified as follows:
SSSO:Storage_Media(?Device_ID)^hasDevice_Type
(?Device_ID,?t)^hasthroughput(?Device_ID,?r)^swrl:
lessThanOrEqual( (?b,2.5) ->Very Low (?b)
SSSO:Storage_Media(?Device_ID)^hasDevice_Type
(?Device_ID,?t)^ hasthroughput (?Device_ID,?r)^swrl:




greaterThan( (?r,50) ^swrl: lessThanOrEqual( (?r,100) -
>Medium(?r)
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The threshold ranges for the Bandwidth attribute of
Network class are classified as follows:
SSSO:Network(?Network_ID)^hasDevice_ID
(Network_ID,?Device_ID)^hasBandwidth(?Device_ID,?b)
^swrl: lessThanOrEqual( (?b,5) ->Low (?b)
SSSO: Network(?Network_ID)^hasDevice_ID
(Network_ID,?Device_ID)^hasBandwidth(?Device_ID,?b)
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